I decided to take debate class this year, and so far, it has been one of the best classes I have ever taken. As a veg*n, you can't even imagine how happy I was when I learned that the first National Forensics League Lincoln-Douglas Debate topic was about animal rights! (At the time, I was just a very strict vegetarian, but switched to full veganism not long after.) I had always lucidly believed in animal rights, but it wasn't until studying that topic that I really became an animal rights activist. I really found it was something that I was incredibly passionate about. I think that the passion I felt with that topic was part of what kicked off a really successful competitive debate career for me. I have honestly lost track of the amount of 1st place trophies that I took at tournaments, particularly with the animal rights topic. I'm not trying to brag, because I really think that the name I made for myself was all due to the fire I had for animal rights, which paved the way to future success. So without further adieu, I present to you, my Affirmative Animal Rights Case (left in debabte format, and original length for debate time regulations.)
“Intelligence is irrelevant on deciding rights. And what’s more relevant is whether these animals are sentient, whether they feel pain. For example, if you—I’ve heard this before, if you punch someone in the stomach, the fact that they are very intelligent doesn’t mean anything. It’s still going to hurt.”
Because I agree with David Blatte’s statement from “Peace Kingdom: Animal Rights,” I am resolved: Morality demands equal recognition of animal rights.
Because justice is “the administering of deserved punishment or reward” (Dictionary.com) and morality is “a social set of standards for good or bad behavior and character” (Cambridge Dictionary Online), my value premise is morality. This value is important to the resolution of animal rights because the majority of our society accepts morality to be a good overarching standard.
My value criterion is equality. Ever since the American and French revolutions, equality has been part of our society’s morés which being a subset of morality is a good criterion for the evaluation thereof.
Definitions:
Demands: to call for or require as just, proper, or necessary (Dictionary.com)
Equal: like or alike in quantity, degree, value; of the same rank, ability, merit. (Dictionary.com)
Recognition: the acknowledgment of something as valid or as entitled to (Dictionary.com)
Animal Rights: the rights to humane treatment claimed on behalf of animals, especially the right not to be exploited for human purposes (American Heritage Dictionary)
I will first show that causing suffering in another sentient being is immoral. Second, Discriminating against animal rights is morally wrong by two arguments: 1. Denying animals rights because they don’t have all the same qualities as humans is speciesist. 2. The existence of marginal humans requires that we acknowledge animal rights.
Contention I: Intentionally causing suffering in another sentient being is immoral. Because animals are sentient they deserve the right not to suffer. We know by observation that an animal being abused will try to move away from the abuser. Animals will also avoid things that caused pain in the past.
As Doris Lin wrote in Basic Tenets of Animal Rights (2011), “Sentience is the ability to suffer. As philosopher Jeremy Bentham wrote, ‘the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but Can they suffer?’ Because a dog is capable of suffering, a dog is worthy of our moral consideration. A table, on the other hand, is incapable of suffering, and is therefore not worthy of our moral consideration. Although harming the table may be morally objectionable if it compromises the economic, esthetic or utilitarian value of the table to the person who owns or uses it, we have no moral duty to the table itself.”
Lin claims that sentience is the ability to suffer. The impact is that if an entity is capable of suffering, it is worth our moral consideration. The warrant can be inferred to be that the treatment of sentient beings deserves moral consideration.
Animal mistreatment leads to violence against humans.
“Statistics show that those with a history of cruelty to animals are more inclined to abuse their families and commit violent crimes against strangers,” Jennifer Copely says in her article “Animal Cruelty Linked to Violence Against People” (2008) as she cites statistics from the FBI.
Because animals are sentient and can feel pain just as humans do, they deserve equal treatment and rights equivalent to those of humans. Causing pain or failing to alleviate pain is usually considered immoral in most cultures.
Doris Lin later says, (Basic Tenets of Animal Rights, 2011)
“Most people recognize that we should not engage in activities that cause pain and suffering to other people. Inherent in that recognition is the knowledge that other people are capable of pain and suffering. If an activity causes undue suffering to someone, the activity is morally unacceptable. If we accept that animals are capable of suffering, it is therefore morally unacceptable to cause them undue suffering.”
Unless we are willing to allow humans to be abused or endure suffering of this magnitude, equality demands that animals are not treated in such a way either.
Contention II: Discriminating against animal rights is morally wrong.
Sub-Argument 1: Denying animals rights because they don’t have all the same qualities as humans is speciesist.
Speciesism is discriminating against animals and failure to recognize the rights of non-humans. Our societies morés have evolved such that discriminating against the rights of women or those of different ethnic backgrounds is wrong. Tom Regan’s Philosophy of Animal Rights reminds us that:
“The same is true of speciesism – the view that members of the species Homo sapiens are superior to members of every other species simply because human beings belong to one’s own (the “superior”) species. For there is no “superior” species. To think otherwise is to be no less prejudiced than racists or sexists.”
Regan is saying that speciesism is just the same as any other form of biased discrimination.
“The same is true of speciesism – the view that members of the species Homo sapiens are superior to members of every other species simply because human beings belong to one’s own (the “superior”) species. For there is no “superior” species. To think otherwise is to be no less prejudiced than racists or sexists.”
Regan is saying that speciesism is just the same as any other form of biased discrimination.
Doris Lin, in Basic Tenets of Animal Rights, (2011) gives us a definition of speciesism.
“To treat animal suffering differently than human suffering is speciesist.”
Denying similar treatment between two beings based on the beings’ inherent qualities is a form of inequality. As Ingemar Nordin so aptly summarizes in “Animals Don’t Have Rights: A Philosophical Study,”
“Just as society’s moral view of rights has widened to include poor people, slaves and women, it is now time to widen it further to include the right of the animals. The animals, he thinks, also have an inviolable right to life. It is now only a question of recognizing this fact, and of really starting to respect their rights. We, humans as well as animals, all have a consciousness and a psychological identity over time. That makes us all a ‘subject-of-life,’ as Tom Regan calls it. And to be such a subject-of-a-life gives us an intrinsic value that demands unconditional respect.”
Nordin claims that Animals should have their rights recognized. The impact is that those who are subject of a life should be given respect. Saying that animals are subject to life warrants this claim. Failure to discourage discrimination between animal rights and human rights would make discouraging sexism and racism hypocritical because they are all essentially the same concept. Discrimination in any form, particularly speciesism, is denying equal treatment. Just as it is immoral to treat someone of the opposite sex or ethnicity unequally, it is wrong to deny rights based on species.
Sub-Argument 2: The existence of marginal humans requires that we acknowledge animal rights. As James Linemann Nelson said in “Animals, handicapped children and the tragedy of marginal cases,”
“There are human beings whose psychological capacities are rivaled or exceeded by many non-human animals; such humans are often referred to as ‘marginal cases.’ R. G. Frey has argued that there is no secure, non-arbitrary way of morally distinguishing between marginal humans and non-human animals.”
A marginal case is either a severely handicapped person such as someone with extreme mental disability or a person in an extended comatose or vegetative state. Scientific ethics find it hard to discriminate between marginal human cases and more “intelligent” animals because the cognitive abilities of said animals often exceed those of marginal cases. In Basic Tenets of Animal Rights, Doris Lin affirms that,
“Animal rights is based on the belief that treating a non-human animal differently just because the animal belongs to a different species is arbitrary and morally wrong. Of course there are differences between human and non-human animals, but those differences are not morally relevant. For example, many believe that humans have some cognitive abilities that are different from or higher than other animals, but cognitive ability is not morally relevant. If it were, the smartest humans would have more moral and legal rights than other humans who were deemed intellectually inferior. Even if this difference were morally relevant, this trait does not apply to all humans. A person who is profoundly mentally retarded does not have the reasoning capabilities of an adult dog, so cognitive ability cannot be used to defend speciesism.”
Lin claims here that cognitive ability is not morally relevant. If it were, the impact would be varying rights even between people of different intelligence levels. Warranting the claim: The differences between animals and humans are not morally relevant. If we are not willing to recognize animal rights, then we have no moral reason not to euthanize mentally handicapped persons. So long as we say that euthanasia or mistreatment of the mentally handicapped is immoral, the higher cognitive abilities of more advanced animals demand that abuse or unnecessary killing of animals is also immoral. Because the cognitive differences between marginal humans and more intelligent animals are clouded at best, equality is the only logical choice. Therefore, I urge the judge to vote Affirmative.
“To treat animal suffering differently than human suffering is speciesist.”
Denying similar treatment between two beings based on the beings’ inherent qualities is a form of inequality. As Ingemar Nordin so aptly summarizes in “Animals Don’t Have Rights: A Philosophical Study,”
“Just as society’s moral view of rights has widened to include poor people, slaves and women, it is now time to widen it further to include the right of the animals. The animals, he thinks, also have an inviolable right to life. It is now only a question of recognizing this fact, and of really starting to respect their rights. We, humans as well as animals, all have a consciousness and a psychological identity over time. That makes us all a ‘subject-of-life,’ as Tom Regan calls it. And to be such a subject-of-a-life gives us an intrinsic value that demands unconditional respect.”
Nordin claims that Animals should have their rights recognized. The impact is that those who are subject of a life should be given respect. Saying that animals are subject to life warrants this claim. Failure to discourage discrimination between animal rights and human rights would make discouraging sexism and racism hypocritical because they are all essentially the same concept. Discrimination in any form, particularly speciesism, is denying equal treatment. Just as it is immoral to treat someone of the opposite sex or ethnicity unequally, it is wrong to deny rights based on species.
Sub-Argument 2: The existence of marginal humans requires that we acknowledge animal rights. As James Linemann Nelson said in “Animals, handicapped children and the tragedy of marginal cases,”
“There are human beings whose psychological capacities are rivaled or exceeded by many non-human animals; such humans are often referred to as ‘marginal cases.’ R. G. Frey has argued that there is no secure, non-arbitrary way of morally distinguishing between marginal humans and non-human animals.”
A marginal case is either a severely handicapped person such as someone with extreme mental disability or a person in an extended comatose or vegetative state. Scientific ethics find it hard to discriminate between marginal human cases and more “intelligent” animals because the cognitive abilities of said animals often exceed those of marginal cases. In Basic Tenets of Animal Rights, Doris Lin affirms that,
“Animal rights is based on the belief that treating a non-human animal differently just because the animal belongs to a different species is arbitrary and morally wrong. Of course there are differences between human and non-human animals, but those differences are not morally relevant. For example, many believe that humans have some cognitive abilities that are different from or higher than other animals, but cognitive ability is not morally relevant. If it were, the smartest humans would have more moral and legal rights than other humans who were deemed intellectually inferior. Even if this difference were morally relevant, this trait does not apply to all humans. A person who is profoundly mentally retarded does not have the reasoning capabilities of an adult dog, so cognitive ability cannot be used to defend speciesism.”
Lin claims here that cognitive ability is not morally relevant. If it were, the impact would be varying rights even between people of different intelligence levels. Warranting the claim: The differences between animals and humans are not morally relevant. If we are not willing to recognize animal rights, then we have no moral reason not to euthanize mentally handicapped persons. So long as we say that euthanasia or mistreatment of the mentally handicapped is immoral, the higher cognitive abilities of more advanced animals demand that abuse or unnecessary killing of animals is also immoral. Because the cognitive differences between marginal humans and more intelligent animals are clouded at best, equality is the only logical choice. Therefore, I urge the judge to vote Affirmative.
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